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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
DENNIS L. WAITE, : Case No. 890615-CA 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Dennis Leroy Waite relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. 
Appellant Waite responds to the State's answer to his opening brief 
as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Financial Information Privacy Act prohibits the 
admission of "information obtained directly and indirectly from a 
financial institution." U.C.A. § 78-27-49. Almost all of the 
evidence and testimony admitted at trial consisted of information 
obtained in violation of the Act. In the absence of the 
information, "there [was] a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for [Defendant/Appellant Dennis L. Waite]." 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989). The State 
failed to prove that the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion 
to suppress constituted "harmless error" beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Alternatively, Appellant Waite improperly received a dual 
conviction and punishment for Theft by Deception and Securities 
Fraud. He should not have been punished twice for the same act. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION TO ALLOW INADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE TO BE USED AT TRIAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
(Reply to Points I & II of Appellee's Brief) 
In its brief, the State conceded that the trial court 
erred in crediting the attorney general with an investigation 
conducted only by the "Utah Securities Division of the Utah 
Department of Business Regulation." 
In order to sustain the trial court's ruling that 
this investigation was "an official investigation 
by . . . the attorney general," this Court would 
have to determine that the mere signing of 
pleadings by an assistant attorney general serves 
as an adoption of investigations which are being 
conducted by other state agencies. This stretches 
the meaning of § 78-27-50 too far. The State 
concedes that the investigation of defendant, 
conducted by the Securities Division of the Utah 
Department of Business Regulation, was not an 
official investigation by the attorney general. 
The attorney general merely acted as counsel for 
the Securities Division; he did not independently 
or jointly initiate or conduct the investigation. 
Consequently, the notice provisions of § 78-27-46 
should have been complied with by the 
investigating agency. Since the provisions were 
not followed, the bank records were inadmissible 
under § 78-27-49. 
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Appellee's Brief at 16. The State and Appellant Waite thus both 
agree that the bank records were inadmissible. 
Yet, in considering the impact of the trial court's error, 
each party still disagrees on its prejudicial effect. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-49 (1987) states in pertinent part: 
No information obtained directly or indirectly from 
a financial institution in violation of the 
provisions of this act shall be admissible in any 
court of this state against the person entitled to 
notice. 
Id. (emphasis added). During the motion to suppress proceeding, the 
prosecuting attorney admitted that Jay Smith, the investigator for 
the Utah Securities Division of the Utah Department of Business 
Regulation, "did not comply with all of the requirements of 
subsection 46 [of the Financial Information Privacy Act]." (MS 11); 
see also Appellant's Brief, Point I (which notes other violations). 
Nevertheless, the information obtained in violation of the Act was 
admitted at trial. 
The plain language of the statute, subsection 49, 
prohibited the State from admitting the information obtained, 
"directly or indirectly," at trial. U.C.A. § 78-27-49. Thus, not 
only were the bank records themselves inadmissible, all other 
information indirectly obtained from the improper disclosure of the 
bank records should have also been suppressed. The trial court's 
decision to admit both types of evidence cannot be considered 
"harmless error." 
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A. ADMITTING INFORMATION OBTAINED DIRECTLY FROM 
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, IN VIOLATION OF THE 
PRIVACY ACT, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
On August 2, 1988, Jay Smith1 received an "Order Permitting 
Access to Financial Records" for the Utah State Credit Union, "with 
respect to the account of Elite Investment Association, Dennis L. 
Waite, account number 150074-2.1" Specifically, the Order required: 
1. Copies of any and all monthly bank statements 
for account number 150074-2.1, Utah State Credit 
Union, from January 1, 1987 through July 1988. 
2. Copies of any and all signature cards on account 
number 150074-2.1, Utah State Credit Union, from 
January 1, 1987 through July 1988. 
3. Copies of any and all debit and credit memos on 
account number 150074-2.1, Utah State Credit Union, 
from January 1, 1987 through July 1988. 
4. Copies of any and all deposit tickets and 
offsets relating to deposits on account number 
150074-2.1, Utah State Credit Union, from January 1, 
1987 through July 1988. 
5. Copies of both sides of any and all withdrawal 
tickets and offsets on account number 150074-2.1, 
Utah State Credit Union, from January 1, 1987 
through July 1988. 
6. Copies of both sides of any and all checks 
deposited into account number 150074-2.1, Utah State 
Credit Union, from January 1, 1987 through July 1988. 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum C. 
1
 Each court order required the named financial 
institution to provide the Utah Securities Division of the Utah 
Department of Business Regulations with copies of the requested 
financial records. See Appellant's Brief, Addendum C(l). Jay Smith 
received and reviewed the court ordered information. No other 
investigator from the Utah Securities Division of the Utah 
Department of Business Regulations provided the State with 
information relevant to the filing of the "Information," the Motion 
to Suppress, or the evidence presented at trial. 
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A total of five orders, all dated August 2, 1988, and all 
with paragraphs substantially similar to those listed above, gave 
Jay Smith access to the accounts of "Elite Investment Association, 
Dennis L. Waite," or the account of "Dennis L. Waite and Patricia P. 
Waite." Four different banks were involved. See Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum C(l). On August 10, 1988, Jay Smith received another 
"Order Permitting Access to Financial Records" for the Utah State 
Credit Union "with respect to the account of Dennis L. Waite, 
account number 152721-6.1." Paragraphs similar to those listed 
above were also included in the Order of August 10, 1988. See 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum F. 
The information obtained from these financial institutions 
constituted "direct" evidence, inadmissible under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-49. The most prejudicial "direct" evidence admitted at 
trial were the numerous copies of the bank records, all of which 
were subparts of Exhibit 18. The front or back of over 65 bank 
records were copied on to 33 pages. They were all presented to the 
jury. 
"In order to constitute reversible error, the error 
complained of must be sufficiently prejudicial that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant 
in its absence." Appellee's Brief at 16-17 (citing State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989)). Exhibit 18 contained 
"[x]eroxed copies of all of the deposits, withdrawals and all of the 
transactions involving that account [Utah State Credit Union]." 
Transcript of the first day of trial, August 3, 1989 (hereinafter 
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referred to as "TA") at 123. As explained by the State, "what 
Exhibit 18 shows is the deposit of all of the checks that we have 
now introduced from five different victims." (TA 123, 126-27). The 
checks introduced previously were Exhibit 1, (TA 19-20); Exhibit 4, 
(TA 45-46); Exhibit 5, (TA 52-53); Exhibit 7, (TA 66-71); Exhibit 9, 
(TA 83-85); Exhibit 10, (TA 83-85); and Exhibit 12, (TA 92, 97, 103). 
Had the trial court not erred in denying Dennis Waite's 
motion to suppress, the jury could not have considered copies of the 
bank records2 obtained directly from the involved financial 
institutions. Indeed, Jay Smith requested access to the financial 
records, "for the purpose of determining the source and disposition 
of funds deposited into said account(s), and to discover the names 
of persons in control of said funds." See Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum B (Affidavit of M. Jay Smith). 
Jay Smith may have suspected Dennis Waite of possible 
wrongdoings, but Smith could not determine who controlled the funds 
or "the source and disposition of funds deposited into said 
account(s)," without first acquiring and reviewing the bank 
records. Similarly, the jury could not have determined exactly what 
had happened to the money without the benefit of the bank records. 
The error was not harmless. See State v. Clark. 783 P.2d 68, 70 
(Utah App. 1989) (the "harmless error standard requires reversal for 
2
 Another copy of "direct" evidence was Exhibit 19, the 
Utah State Credit Union signature card for Elite Investment 
Association membership application. (TA 128-29). 
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errors violating the federal constitution [unlawful search and 
seizure] unless they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
B. ADMITTING INFORMATION OBTAINED INDIRECTLY FROM 
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, IN VIOLATION OF THE 
PRIVACY ACT, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
Although the trial court's error in admitting "direct" 
evidence (the bank records) constituted "sufficiently prejudicial" 
error, the additional error in admitting "indirect" evidence 
provided further "sufficiently prejudicial" error. The information 
obtained indirectly from the financial institutions began with the 
"tracing" conducted by Jay Smith and ended with testimony given at 
trial. As acknowledged by the State, "The evidence is that the 
investigation of defendant's (Dennis Waite) bank records was 
conducted by Merlin Jay Smith of the Securities Division of the Utah 
Department of Business Regulation." Appellee's Brief at 15. The 
extent to which Mr. Smith relied on the bank records can be gleaned 
from the following testimony: 
Q [By the State]: Did you, [Jay Smith], as a part 
of your investigation, have a chance to review the 
bank records from the Utah State Credit Union? 
A [Jay Smith]: Yes, sir, I did. 
Q Let me show you then what has been introduced 
as Exhibit 18. Did you find out when you reviewed 
the records that the checks from the five victims in 
this case ended up in that account? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
. . . 
Q Did you find the withdrawals on the account 
also? 
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A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q What did you do as far as your investigation 
once you found those withdrawals? 
A I traced the funds deposited and withdrawn from 
the account. 
Q And you had a chance, I guess, to look at the 
entire account from the Utah State Credit Union? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did you ever find any kind of withdrawals that 
went to this University of Denver? 
A No, sir. 
Q What did you do with the records themselves? 
A With the documents that I received from the 
bank, you mean? 
Q Uh-huh. 
A I examined those records to determine the use 
of the funds and traced those funds to their 
conclusion. 
Transcript of the second day of trial, August 4, 1989 (hereinafter 
referred to as "TB") at 20-22. Consequently, "information obtained 
directly or indirectly from a financial institution," U.C.A. 
§ 78-27-49, also included information relating to the bank funds 
which were traced by Jay Smith. Many other exhibits should not have 
been admitted. 
Exhibit 17 was "a summary statement showing all of the 
deposits, withdrawals and the balance in the account for Elite 
Investment from December of 1987 up through April of 1988." 
(TA 122). The State noted a "direct correlation between Exhibit 18 
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and the summary on 17." (TA 123). Exhibit 18 pertained to all of 
the transactions conducted through the appropriate financial 
institutions. 
Exhibit 23 reflected "all of the purchases by Elite 
Investment through the summer of 1988." (T 10, 17). The names of 
various individuals were listed, including some of the witnesses 
testifying for the State, together with dates, balances, and amounts 
added or withdrawn. 
Exhibit 24 was "a copy of a newspaper advertisement that 
[Jay Smith] received in tracing one check to its conclusion." 
(TB 28). In his examination of the checks, Jay Smith "traced [a 
check] to its source and discovered [that it] had been used to pay 
for newspaper advertisement. (TB 28). 
Exhibit 25 was "a copy of [Jay Smith's] original summary 
that [he] prepared when [he] examined the records ['with respect to 
the account of Elite Investment Association, Dennis L. Waite,' Utah 
State Credit Union]." (TA 24). Exhibit 25 was also the subject of 
much debate though it was ultimately admitted for the jury's 
consideration. (TA 24-28). The court allowed the "summary of the 
bank records [because it] may . . . assist . . . the finder of 
fact." (TB 23). But see Appellant's Brief, Point IV. 
In addition to the numerous Exhibits prejudicially admitted 
into evidence, the stipulations made by defendant Waite and the 
testimony presented by the State also constituted "information 
obtained directly or indirectly from a financial institution." 
U.C.A. § 78-27-49. Very few, if any, of the stipulations would have 
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been given by Dennis Waite at trial had the bank records been 
suppressed. See e.g., (TB 1-3) (defendant Waite stipulated to four 
cashier checks withdrawn from the Utah State Credit Union account). 
The stipulations were based, in part, on the court's erroneous 
decision to not suppress information obtained indirectly from the 
bank records. 
Moreover, the entire testimony of Jay Smith stemmed from 
the bank records he had accessed and reviewed. See (TB 19-38). 
Without the bank records, Jay Smith was left with nothing more than 
the suspicion shared by the State's other testifying witnesses. 
Compare Henrv v. United States. 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959) ("common 
rumor or report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to suspect' [is] 
not adequate to support [a probable cause determination for] a 
warrant for arrest.") with State v. Richards. 779 P.2d 689 (Utah 
App. 1989) (noting "that there is a significant difference between 
the quantum of evidence required for [a] conviction [proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt] and [the lesser amount of evidence] required to 
constitute sufficient probable cause for an arrest"). In the 
absence of Jay Smith's testimony and summaries, alone, the State did 
not possess enough evidence to support a criminal conviction. 
The State's other witnesses merely explained how they had 
met Dennis Waite; how he had suggested bonds with appealing interest 
rates; and how money was exchanged between the parties. At best, 
the witnesses' testimony reflected their concern about Waite's 
failure to maintain contact and to send the bonds or interest 
payments. Nevertheless, all the witnesses, like Jay Smith, required 
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access to the financial records "for the purpose of determining the 
source and disposition of funds deposited into said account(s) 
[relating to Dennis Waite], and to discover the names of persons in 
control of said funds," See Appellant's Brief, Addendum B 
("Affidavit of M. Jay Smith" filed in support of the "Application 
For Order Permitting Access To Financial Records"). Without the 
"information obtained directly or indirectly from [the] financial 
institutions," U.C.A. § 78-27-49, the State would not have had 
enough information for the filing of the "Information," (R 19-22), 
let alone evidence sufficient to support a conviction "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Thus, 
even accepting all the facts noted by the State, see Appellee's 
Brief at 3-9, "the error complained of [was] sufficiently 
prejudicial that there [was] a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant in its absence." State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989). State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 
68, 70 (Utah App. 1989) (the "harmless error standard requires 
reversal for errors violating the federal constitutional [unlawful 
search and seizure] unless they are harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt"). 
POINT II 
APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AND 
SENTENCED TWICE FOR THE SAME ACT. 
(Reply to Point V of Appellee's Brief) 
Assuming, arguendo, this Court finds the trial court's 
error to be harmless error, and assuming further that the other 
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arguments made by Appellant Waite in his opening brief do not apply, 
see Appellant's opening brief, Points III & IV, Appellant still 
should not have been convicted for both the greater offense of Theft 
by Deception and the lesser included offense of Securities Fraud. 
In its brief, the State attempts to justify Appellant's 
convictions by speculating that the jury may have focused only on 
the prosecution's theory of an unlawful offer to sell securities, 
rather than an unlawful sale of securities. The State explained: 
The evidence presented at trial was that 
defendant offered and sold securities to the victims 
in a fraudulent scheme or practice. The actual 
sales of the securities were the acts for which 
defendant was convicted of theft by deception. If 
those were the acts for which defendant was 
convicted of securities fraud, the securities fraud 
convictions could not stand. Convictions for both 
theft by deception and securities fraud based on the 
same acts of selling securities to the victims would 
violate section 76-1-402(1). If, on the other hand, 
the securities fraud convictions were based on the 
offers to sell securities to the victims, the 
convictions can coexist. The acts of offering to 
sell the securities were distinct from the acts of 
selling the securities. 
The record is not totally clear as to whether 
the securities fraud counts were based on the offer 
or the sale of the securities. The jury 
instructions do not differentiate between the two 
different acts. 
Appellee's brief at 25-26 (emphasis in original). 
The State's argument3 is premised on the hope and 
3
 The State also attempts to uphold Appellant's 
convictions, in part, because Appellant told "the victims that he 
was using their money to purchase bonds for them. The bonds were 
never purchased . . . [He] also told some of the victims that he 
already had the bonds and that the bonds were contained in the 
victim's file . . . ." Appellee's Brief at 19-20. In other words, 
(continued) 
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assumption that the jury disregarded some of the evidence while 
focusing entirely on other submitted evidence. Yet, the State does 
admit that if defendant Waite's theft by deception convictions were 
based on the actual sales of securities, "the securities fraud 
convictions could not stand" because they were "based on the same 
acts of selling securities to the victims. . . . " Appellee,s Brief 
at 25-26. Since the evidence could have, and may have in fact 
supported such a basis, the resulting dual convictions and 
punishments were improper. See State v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96, 97-98 
(Utah 1983). See also Appellant's opening brief, Point V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing Appellant, Dennis Leroy Waite, 
respectfully requests that his convictions be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3~) day of September, 1990. 
ONAtD S. FUJI R L frUJINO 
Attorney for Appellant 
(footnote 3 continued) 
Dennis Waite was "putting his clients off" and neglecting to follow 
through immediately on stated promises after he had received their 
money. Though such actions are not to be condoned, they do not 
necessarily rise to the level of criminal conduct. Cf. Utah Bar 
Journal, Vol.3, No.4 at 16 (April 1990) (one attorney was suspended 
for, inter alia, failing to respond to his client for a period 
exceeding four years and for failing to perform work and return the 
client's file when requested to do so). 
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